II.
Muslim Dissention
and Christian Institutions of Warfare
From the very
beginning, the Crusaders demonstrated a willingness to adapt to their new
surroundings that would serve them well throughout the crusading period. While the armies of the First Crusade
continued preparations for their journey to Jerusalem, on advice from Emperor
Alexius I, its leaders dispatched an embassy to negotiate peace with the
Fatimid Dynasty of Egypt, adversaries of the Seljuk Turks who occupied the
majority of Asia Minor.
Taking such
advice proved remarkably fortunate for the expedition since it appeared
doubtful that the crusaders would have capitalized on the internal divisions
that wracked the Islamic Civilization.
Most likely this can be attributed to the lack of organization amongst
the Christian leaders as they jostled for authority over the expedition, rather
than any lack of prior knowledge about their Muslim adversaries divisions. In fact, throughout their march across Asia
Minor and Syria, the Western leaders appeared surprisingly well informed of
their opponents’ alliances. The protracted negotiations with the Fatimid
rulers of Egypt, which began as early as June 1097 and lasted until May 1099,
exploited Islamic internal divisions by playing rival powers off against one
another. But such political schemes had
a price. By becoming embroiled in the
political wrangling of Near Eastern powers, the Franks would find themselves
increasingly mixed in with these same powers.
Indeed, to a degree, Muslim powers would accept the new “Crusading”
Kingdoms as another element in the political make-up of the Near East and would
even pursue policies of interaction with their Frankish neighbors.
However, for the average crusader, who
generally tended to be artisans townspersons, or peasants, the differences
between “Turks,” “Arabs,” and “Fatimids” may not have been as apparent. Excluding the relatively rare exception for
those who made pilgrimages to the Holy Land, the vast majority of Western
Europeans had no direct contact with Islamic culture. By the end of the eleventh century, three of the four major
armies’ countries of origin had been geographically separated from any Islamic
contact; Raymond IV of Toulouse, representative of the knights of Provence,
Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lower Lotharingia, and Robert II of Flanders, of
the northern French. Such a lack of
prior knowledge encouraged prejudices and stereotypes, adding to inter-communal
frictions during the crusading state period. In fact, those earlier Franks who
had been acclimated to the Near Eastern often had to restrain newcomers from
attacking the “wrong” Muslims. The only
major army whose soldiers would have come into daily contact with Muslims was Bohemond of Taranto Norman
army of southern Italy. However, not
only did they incesstantly fight Muslims for control over Sicily, they fought
Byzantines as well, which caused problems in their march through the Roman
Empire.
Nevertheless, for the common crusader, the
Islamic civilization that stretched from Central Asia, through the Middle East,
across North Africa, and into the Iberian Peninsula would have appeared as an
impressive sight indeed. To the
unknowing Latin who entered this foreign land, the Islamic civilization
presented a united front that under the universal power wielded of the caliph,
regarded as direct successor of the prophet Muhammad,
threatened to encircle Western Europe.
In actuality, no caliph had wielded
such widespread power since the height of the ‘Abbasid dynasty during the ninth
century and by 969, a minor sect within the Islamic faith known as the Shi’ites
had established a rival caliphate in Egypt, the Fatimid Dynasty. The Shi’ites differed in their ideology to
the ‘Abbasid Sunnis in that they not only adhered to the teachings of Muhammad,
but also recognized the religious guidance of his family, the Ahl al-Bayt,
or his descendants known as Shi'a Imams.
The Shi’ites considered these descendants as the keepers and instructors
of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Furthermore, the Shi’ites believed that Ali ibn Abi
Talib, Muhammad's cousin and husband of Fatimah, was the true successor to
Muhammad and thus reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs of Islamic
history. While the Fatimid Dynasty’s gained power
and expanded into Palestine and Syria, the ‘Abbasid caliphates became virtual
prisoners to the Buyids, a Persian Shi’i dynasty situated in modern day Iran
and eastern Iraq.
However, by 1040, another force
appeared in the political struggles of the Near East. The Seljuks, Turkish nomads from near the Aral Sea who had
recently converted to Sunni Islam, conquered Afghanistan and much of the
Eastern Persian Empire. By 1055, Seljuk forces captured Baghdad,
where they were warmly welcomed by the enfeebled ‘Abbasid caliphate. The Seljuk Empire reached its height in the
1070’s, when the sultan Alp Arslan defeated a Byzantine army at Manzikert,
seizing control over the majority Asia Minor. However, soon after the battle, Arslan died,
leaving the empire to fall into a bitter civil war which fractured the empire
into a number of dissident kingdoms.
Members of the Seljuk family established themselves as sultans in the
Western Half of Asia Minor, called Anatolia, turning Nicea into their
capital. The Danishmends, a martial,
nomadic people, established their own dynasty in the north and central area of
the peninsula. When the armies of the
First Crusade entered the western Anatolia, they found a land so divided by
rivalry that not even a threat such as the Crusaders produced could yield a
collective response.
So intense did the Muslims’ dissension
appear, which made it so favorable for an invading force to exploit, that some
have questioned whether Alexius I and Urban II deliberately timed their
initiative to take advantage of the situation. Subsequent successes in Cilicia, at Edessa,
and Antioch, in part due to the failure of competing Muslim powers to unite,
can only further such a hypothesis. However, I believe there is something
deeper here. By willingly coming to
terms with certain Islamic groups, the Franks allowed themselves to be
progressively drawn into the political spheres of the Near East. This
demonstrates that the Franks actively sought out and sustained alliances that
could benefit both groups, and calls into question the defensive oriented
perception that the Franks limited their contact with Muslim society to a
minimum. Nonetheless, for the Franks to
reach their ultimate goal, Jerusalem, they would need more than skillful
political wrangling. And with the army
gathering around the Islamic city of Nicaea, capital of the Seljuk sultan Kilij
Arslan and gateway to one of the main routes through Anatolia, they would need
to use that readiness to adjust on the battlefield.
By the end of April 1097, Godfrey and
the Norman army had broken camp and begun the short march to take the
campaign’s first objective, Nicaea. In
Christian lore, Nicaea was a famous site for a number of early Christian
councils. The city was built on a good
strategic position, a fertile basin at the eastern end of the Lake İznik that
was bounded by numerous ranges of hills to the north and south. With high walls
running straight to the water and containing over two hundred towers, Nicaea
defenses would prove difficult to breach, especially around its waterside. The lake was large enough that it could not
be blockaded from land easily, while the city was large enough to make attempts
to reach the harbor from shore-based siege weapons very difficult.
Godfrey
arrived on 6 May and, although it would take another four weeks before the
whole army had assembled, preparations for the siege had begun as early as 14
May. The crusaders were intimately familiar with
the forms of labor surrounding this military institution; the castle. For at the time of the crusades, medieval
Western Europe was littered with them and their proliferation profoundly
influenced the conduct of war. In truth, so closely were knights associated
with their castles they often referred to themselves as the homines (“Good
men”) of a specific castle rather than that of a particular lord. In an age where the level of technological
innovation forced men into fighting pitched battles hand-to-hand, anyone who
could obtain even a minimal advantage in height and shelter was at an enormous
advantage. Therefore, even at their most simplistic,
castles could prove formidable obstacles to overcome.
The art of
surmounting such structures was a vital part of Western European warfare that
the crusaders brought with them to the Near East. A successful siege depended on
persistence, determination, and organization, each of which the crusaders
demonstrated amply. To breach Nicaea’s
walls, the westerners used an assortment of siege technology that included
catapults and siege towers, established a common fund for expenses, and even
hired an Italian engineer. However, this proved largely ineffectual as
the crusaders could not entirely blockade the lake on which the city was
situated, allowing supplies to slip into the city. Thus, for Franks to be
successful they needed to adapt existing technology to the needs of war. This came through the help of Emperor
Alexius, who allowed Greek ships to be sent overland and refloated on the
lake. With the blockade finally
complete and the defeat of a relief force by Kilij Arslan, the garrison surrendered
on 19 June to Byzantine admiral Butumites .
Nicaea’s surrender and subsequent return
to the Byzantine Empire re-established Eastern Roman power in Western Anatolia
and alternately undermined that of the Seljuk Turks. And although it did not provide the Franks much in the way of
plunder, Alexius had forbidden the crusaders to enter the city, Nicaea can be
seen as an initial testing ground for the Christian expedition. Their decisive victory over the relief
attack by Kilij Arslan was a remarkable achievement for such a novice and
fragmented force, even if these same problems would hinder later efforts during
the campaign. It also forced, at least
partially, an organization of the power structure with the leading members of
the princes’ council through their coordination of the siege. However, the return of the Byzantine city
hints at more than just additional military experience for the crusaders. Their success may suggest an emerging
pattern of confrontation that would lay the foundation for future acclimation
of the Franks in the Near East. Nicaea
was the first of three large sieges that dominated the First Crusade. Such gains would necessitate a garrison to
remain within the city to preserve order amongst the indigenous populace and
provide a ready defense against future Muslim attacks. Generally, such a garrison would institute
itself as the governing body, establishing themselves at the top of the
poltical hierarchy. If such groups
wished to remain in power, they would need to adapt, at least partially, to the
dominant culture. Thus, their success
at Nicaea and with each successful siege would signal the arrival of a new,
fixed group in Near Eastern politics. A
group, as the crusaders began their march across Anatolia on 27 June, whose presence
would be felt for far longer than anyone could have anticipated.
With Nicaea secure, the Franks followed
the old Roman Roman south-west into the interior of Anatolia. They found it to be a desolate place.
Turkish forces had devastated the surrounding countryside before retreating to
the mountains. Fulcher of Chartres bemoaned:
“A land once rich and
excellent in all the fruits of the earth, had been so cruelly ravaged by the
Turks, that there were only small patches of cultivation to be seen at long
intervals.”-
Food for
both man and horse were scarce, straining the already limited supplies of such
a large army. It was possibly for this
reason, to cover greater space for foraging, that the army split into two; each
a roughly equal sized column, marching parallel to one another some seven miles
apart. The right-column was comprised of the
followers of Godfrey of Bouillion, Raymond of Toulouse, Hugh Count of
Vermandois, and the majority of the French and Lotharingian contingents. While the left column included Bohemond and
Tancred with their Sicilian Normans, Robert of Flanders, Robert of Normandy,
and Stephen of Blois.
After
descending the Bithyninan Mountains in late June, the two columns of the First
Crusade found themselves in a broad highland plain. It was a rolling countryside that supported little in the ways of
strong, defensible positions. This was
a serious problem for the horseless crusader that the leaders of the First
Crusade were particularly aware of. In
the West, the climate, geography, and topography often favored the
infantryman. Large stretches of
comparatively flat land, as was common across the battlefields of the Near
East, were rare in the West. It had
allowed foot soldiers to use any large obstacle, such as a hedge, wooded area,
or steep hill, as a rallying point against both mounted and un-mounted
opponents. Nonetheless, the
discrepancies of climate and topography for the crusading foot-solider were
only the beginning of an otherwise much larger problem in the crusading army’s
approach to warfare.
When compared
to their Near Eastern counterparts, Western armies followed a more traditional
style of combat with a combination of infantry and cavalry. However, these elements were sharply
differentiated. Clearly, cavalry held
an advantage on the battlefield; highly mobile, better trained, and well-armed,
cavalry could dictate the course of battle.
The king and other leading men may have possessed something similar to
an armory, but usually those who followed him, whether wealthy proprietor or
poor infantryman, equipped themselves.
Thus, it should be unsurprising that the rich heavily invested in
self-protection at the expense of other priorities; the under-use of the
crossbow and lack of proper military training for the infantry being notable
highlights. Both were expensive
endeavors that did not correspond to the priorities of the wealthy. Thus, the
resulting forces were sharply divided between well-armed, mounted men and very
lightly equipped foot soldiers, with little in between.
Yet, this
marked dichotomy between the horseman and the horseless was driven more by
medieval economic, social, and political factors than by military necessity.
Land was by far the most important form of wealth in Western Europe. The economy was driven by subsistence
agriculture; the lack of hard currency commonly meant that renders due from
land were in part paid in kind. Even
kings were essentially just larger landholders. This made the maintenance of large standing armies unfeasible. Therefore, if a king wanted to raise a large
army, he was forced to look toward two sources; family members and other
wealthy proprietors.
Family
ties were important because they created a core group of followers that would
be the largest supporters of the king.
Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lotharingia and future King of
Jerusalem, was not only accompanied by his younger brother Baldwin and wife on
Crusade, but
Godfrey’s butler, Ruthard,
seneschal, Baldric,
and chamberlain, Stabelo. However, Godfrey needed other wealthy
proprietors’ support, which filled out his army with their own retainers, just
as much as his direct family’s. However, bonds of obligation to a lord could be
vague at best. So to keep minor lords
support, Duke Godfrey repeatedly bestowed important military and diplomatic
missions toward the leading lords of the Lower Lotharingian contingent. Peter of Dampierre accompanied an embassy to
King Coloman of Hungry during the expeditions initial march through Europe
while Rainald of Toul was placed in charge of a reserve division at the Battle
of Antioch in 1098. But, even such high honors could not keep
some lords in check. In fact, two Lower
Lotharingians, Baldwin of Hainaut and Henry of Esch, broke traditional military
discipline by moving ahead of the main army in Thrace in order to reach
Constantinople and share in Alexius’ generous welcoming ceremony.
In
summation, large Western armies, such as the ones that left for Jerusalem in
1096, were little more than an amalgamation of smaller armies, centered on a
core group of knights that were intimately bound to their leader, and a large,
loosely obligated following.
The wealthy, adhering to contemporary culture’s belief in military
individualism, invested their money in self-protection, for obvious reasons,
instead of developing an infrastructure focused on war that would be capable of
imposing unity and discipline amongst their troops. Thus, the common foot-soldier and cavalryman alike rarely
received enough cohesive training to be fully capable on the battlefield. However, cavalrymen could make up for this
slightly through their mobility and individual training while infantry, who
relied on mass and cohesion more than cavalry, could not. It is hard to imagine how an amalgamated
army could present itself on the battlefield.
A loose command structure, little to no group experience, and a sharp
dichotomy of training between cavalry and infantry made even the simplest
maneuvers difficult, if not impossible. The tactical consequences were that
western commanders actively avoided pitched battle and, in some cases, even
sieges. Instead, a war of destruction,
razing the precious land that was so vital to Western economy, was the
preferred method to victory. However,
for the First Crusade, pitched battles could not be avoided when faced with a
well-motivated and highly mobile enemy army.
An hour
after breaking camp on July 1st some miles (find) north of the
Thymbres, the left division, under the general charge of Bohemond I, began
receiving reports of a Muslim host in vast numbers. The prince quickly ordered the tents to be pitched and the
baggage unladed by the side of a marsh to provide cover. As the infantry went about their task,
Bohemond assembled his battle line made exclusively of cavalry, leaving the
foot soldiers to guard the camp.
Neither the camp was completely pitched, nor the battle line in complete order
when the first waves of Seljouk horsemen archers appeared from all
directions. Within minutes, the
Christians became completely enveloped in the swarms of mounted horse
archers. Fulcher of Chartres spoke of
the novelty of not seeing a single foot soldier amongst them. Yet, the Muslims
did not engage the heavily armored knights in hand-to-hand combat. Instead, they let loose a barrage of arrows
from horseback to harass their enemy before riding off to the flanks, only to
be replaced by fresh troops with fully laden quivers.
Fearing
that his battle line would fall into disorder against such a highly mobile
enemy, Bohemond held back from ordering a general charge. This quickly frustrated the Franks, who
could only sit and watch as the Seljuks continued to fire arrows upon them, and
groups of Christians launched themselves at the enemy. The heavy horsemen could not catch their
lighter Islamic counterparts as they hurriedly withdrew from the charging
knights. These groups became easy
targets for the skilled horse archers, who shot the horses out from underneath
the Franks. The mail-clad knights
initially suffered much less than might have been expected. But when they
turned to make their way to their own lines, the Muslims would ride in,
surrounding the Latins before slaughtering many of the groups wholesale. The rest, watching from the relative safety
of their own battle line, saw the futility of such a course and resolved to
tighten ranks and hold firm. After
several hours of near constant barrage, the line became loose and
disorganized. Soon the flanks collapsed
in on the center and the remaining Franks gave up the field, falling back
towards the camp in mass.
There was
no help to be found at the camp. In the
several hours that the knights had stood against the shower of arrows, Seljuks
had assailed the camp from the rear.
The infantry, taken aback by such a maneuver, appeared to have been
routed almost instantly. When the
fleeing knights finally made their way back to camp, they found it already
being pillaged and the non-combatants slain by the Muslims. Fulcher described the desperation of the
scene:
“…crushed one against another like sheep penned up in
a fold, helpless and panic-stricken, we were shut in by the Turks on every
side, and had not the courage to break out at any point. The air was filled with shouts and screams,
partly from the combatants, partly from the multitude in the camp. Already we had lost all hope of saving
ourselves, and were owning our sins and commending ourselves to God’s
Mercy. Believing themselves at the
point to die, many men left the ranks and asked for absolution from the nearest
priest. It was to little purpose that
our chiefs… kept striving to beat back the Infidels, and sometimes charged out
against them. The Turks had closed in,
and were attacking us with the greatest audacity.” (275)
It
appeared as if the Christian army would face a catastrophic defeat, but in the
critical moment of battle, momentum swung back to the Crusaders. Messengers had ridden out prior to battle,
trying to track down the missing right column, finding them some six to seven
miles away. Once alerted, Duke Godfrey and the other
chiefs led their host of knights at full gallop to aid their beset companions,
leaving their own infantry behind to guard the camp. The Turks appeared to have wholly neglected to address the
possible arrival of Godfrey’s column and the Crusaders entered the field unopposed
at an optimal position, on the left flank and rear of the Turkish host, which
had concentrated into a small space as it attacked Bohemond’s camp. Godfrey and his men charged straight into
the enemy, striking the Seljuks unaware, rolling up their left flank and
striking the center from their rear. The Turks had no time to mount a defense
and the shock of Godfrey’s charge sent a wave of panic throughout the enemy
army and almost immediately routed the Seljouk. In the aftermath, the victorious Crusaders pursued the Muslims
off the field, scattering their forces and seizing the enemy’s camp. For three days’ journey from the field, the
bodies of horses could be seen, ridden to death by their fleeing Turkish riders.
The
possession of light cavalry and particularly horse archers gave Islamic
commanders options in the approach to battle unknown in the West. Throughout the Middle East, large plains for
grazing made the rearing of light horses relatively easy. This contrasted with the congested topography
of western farming: Europeans lacked such vast plains and therefore focused its
horse-raising on stall-fed larger animals. The natural consequence was that Near
Eastern light horses were very easily available and with the establishment of
Turkish tribes in authority, a continual supply of effective horse archers
could be brought into Islamic armies.
Such tribesmen were natural soldiers.
The anonymous author of the Gesta Francorum speaks of being
struck by the swirling Turkish horsemen and their tactics. However, this is not to say that the light
cavalryman monopolized Muslim armies.
Turkish armies in Asia Minor were atypical in their nearly complete
dependence on them. Heavy horsemen,
such as Saladin’s ghulams nearly a century later, and common infantry
filled specific roles throughout other Islamic armies. But, the maneuverability of light cavalry
gave Islamic armies an edge that the rigid battle lines of the West could not
initially match. Yet, as undeserved as
the victory at Dorylaeum was, it granted the Christians a free passage
throughout the rest of Asia Minor. They
would not be forced to fight another pitched battle until they had reached
Antioch.
For the
sake of our study, we must quickly pass over the latter stages of the First
Crusade. It is not that the sieges of
Antioch and Jerusalem or the Battle of Antioch are any less important. It is a truth barely worth making the point
that such events are significant in the First Crusade, having been the focuses
of numerous later studies. Their
stories only serve to reiterate my earlier concepts. The labor and suffering involved in taking fortified cities,
especially at the siege of Antioch, would almost certainly have set in the
Frankish mind a feeling of the conquerors right to govern. Added to this was
Emperor Alexius’ failure to aid the Latins.
Under false information, which detailed the entire expedition meeting
their doom at the gates of Antioch, Alexius decided to reverse the march of his
army, leaving the Latins to finish the siege and the subsequent battle by
themselves. This drove a deep wedge
between Frank and Roman that served as verification for the Latins that their
control over such cities would become permanent. Hence, the only question would be who would rule such a magnificent
city? In the end, Bohemond won out, but
the most important fact for our study would be that finally, after a year
marching through Muslim controlled territory, the Crusaders had taken a major
city in which they could use as a base of operations to extend Christian
power. Jerusalem’s capture confirmed
that Franks were here to stay. But, if
they wanted to maintain their foothold, they needed to adapt their rigid
structure of warfare to compete in the new environment.
From 1098
to 1099, the crusaders embarked on a series of minor sieges, culminating in the
capture of Jerusalem and massacre of its populace during mid-July.
“if you had
been there you would have seen our feet colored to our ankles with the blood of
the slain…[before all the] clergy and laymen, went to the Sepulcher of the Lord
and His glorious temple, singing the ninth chant. With fitting humility, they
repeated prayers and made their offering at the holy places…”
It
was not until August 1099 that another pitched battle was waged upon open
ground. However, this time the
Crusaders did not face their accustomed Turkish enemy. Instead, the Franks looked across the
battlefield to observe the banners of El-Mustali Abul-Kasim Ahmed, caliphate of
the Fatimids. Since the beginning of
the First Crusade, the Crusaders had been in negotiations with the Fatimid
Empire to exploit Islamic political divisions.
The Egyptions were more than willing to tolerate Christian authority
over Seljuk Syria,
but no satisfactory concession could be reached regarding the control of the
Holy City, which was under Fatimid control.
When the Crusaders finally wrested control of the city away from the
Egyptians, El-Mustali quickly dispatched his general, vizier al-afdal Shahanshah,
and a large army, estimated at some twenty thousand men,
north into Palestine. But, unlike the
Turks, the Egyptian army used a far more traditional style of warfare, relying
on a combination of mercenary troops that included; massed formations of
Sudanese light infantry, who used both bow and iron mace, Moorish and Bedouin
light horsemen, armed with only spears, and the partially mailed troopers of
the Caliph’s regular army. And unlike the Seljuks, whose mounted
archers had for so long frustrated the Franks in battle, the entirety of the
Egyptians mounted troops were spearmen.
Surprisingly,
the Franks marched out of Jerusalem on August 13, intent on meeting the Muslims
in the open field with some twelve hundred knights and nine thousand foot
soldiers. Such aggressiveness is an
early example of Frankish military adaptation.
Two years of near constant war had given the army great experience in
fighting together. Therefore, when the
Franks marched out of their newly conquered city, they were already a more
disciplined and cohesive army than those of the West. This flexibility is demonstrated by the crusaders’ style of march
as they drew within the vicinity of the enemy.
Fearing the surprise assault that had been such a common ploy in Syria,
the Franks formed their army into nine smaller corps, each a combination of
cavalry and foot. The corps marched three abreast, creating a front of three
divisions from each sides. This
“fighting march” allowed the Franks to absorb the shock of a sudden assault
with the initial three corps, sustain the line with the three behind that, and
use reserves when needed with the final three corps behind that. Sustaining a formation on the move could
only have been achieved by well-disciplined and cohesive troops. However, it wasn’t so much that the infantry
and cavalry cooperated as that the army as a whole was capable of working
together in a manner unknown or even possible in the West. Ironically, so far were the Crusaders from a
Muslim assault that they unknowingly stumbled across the flocks and herds of
the Fatimid Army, surprising the enemy instead.
It was
the survivors of this surprise assault that brought the location of the enemy
army to Vizier Al-Afdal, who then prepared his men for battle the next
morning. The Egyptian vizier positioned
his army on the shore north of the town of Ascalon; resting the left wing
against the coast and the right wing with a stretch of hills running parallel
to the shore two miles inland. His line was made up of Sudanese archers, which
doubled as his infantry, with regular cavalry behind them. A corps of Bedouin horsemen had been placed
on the extreme right flank in an attempt to turn the enemy’s flank. By situating his much larger army across
this wide topographical corridor, al-Afdal not only forced the Crusaders to
stretch their own battle line, thereby weakening it, but maintained an ability
to envelope their right flank.
On August
14 the crusaders came into sight, marching into the corridor deployed in the
same three-corps columns as the day before.
When the Crusaders drew near the Egyptians, the first line under Robert
of Normandy halted to allow the following two lines, under Raymond of Toulouse
and Godfrey of Bouillon respectively, to file off to the left towards the
coastline and right towards the hills.
Thus, when battle was about to be joined, the Crusaders came in one
continuous line, with infantry in the front and cavalry to the rear, which held
no reserves behind them.
The
battle began when the Sudanese archers “[fell] on one knee to shoot, according
to custom” as the rest
of the Egyptian army begin to yell and insult the Crusaders, attempting to
taunt their opponents in so the Bedouin’s could turn their flank. Godfrey’s knights easily suppressed the
attempt before joining in the general Christian advance. Despite numerical superiority, it appears
that al-Afdal’s army began to route early and quickly. The massed cavalry charge employed by the
Franks effectively pushed back the infantry into the second line, causing
massed confusion throughout the Egyptian battle line. Dubbed the “famous onslaught” or their “famous charge” by Muslim
sources, the massed cavalry charge was tactical innovation virtually unheard of
in the west. To be successful, this disciplined onslaught
required precision time, engaging the enemy at their weakest moment; when the
highly mobile Muslin cavalry became clogged within a small area. Hints to its effectiveness can be drawn from
one of the earliest battles of the First Crusade, the Battle of Dorylaeum,
where Godfrey’s timely charge into the left rear of the Turkish host won the
day for the Franks and saved Bohemund’s column from total annihilation.
In the
ensuing chaos, the Egyptian army fled in all directions; running back towards
the heavily fortified city of Ascalon, diving into the Mediterranean waters to
swim for the Egyptian fleet that had moored off shore, or hiding near by atop
palm trees. The crusaders spent the night in the enemy’s abandoned camp,
preparing for another attack, but in the morning they learned that the Fatimids
were retreating back to Egypt. After taking as much plunder as they could,
which included the army standard and al-Afdal’s personal tent, the crusaders
burnt the rest. They return to
Jerusalem amidst celebration and only afterwards did Godfrey and Raymond claim
Ascalon for the Christians. But, even
after the Muslim garrison heard this claim, they refused to surrender. Therefore, Ascalon remained under Fatimid
control and was quickly re-garrisoned.
It became the base of operations for future Egyptian raids and invasions
into the Kingdom of Jerusalem every year afterwards until it was finally
captured by the crusaders in 1153.
After the Battle of Ascalon, the majority of the remaining crusaders
returned home to Western Europe, their vows of pilgrimage having been
fulfilled.
The Franks who would make up the crusading states learned that they had
to be aggressive if they were to survive in the Near East; depending on their
readiness to meet their enemies on the battlefield. The Frankish mindset had to be utterly convinced of their
military superiority. And although this may at times have led Latin commanders
into acts of recklessness, in 1101 Baldwin I charged an Egyptian army of 15,000
with no more than 200 knights,
it only serves to demonstrate their readiness to accept battle to a degree
unknown in the west. Furthermore, the
armies of the crusader states were more disciplined and cohesive than those of
the west because they had to be. A lack
of sufficient manpower forced the Franks to develop a flexible army with the
ability to perform difficult maneuvers, such as the fighting march, or tactical
innovations, such as the mass cavalry charge.
Therefore, warfare was an inlet for and an expression of Frankish
acclimation to Near Eastern culture; its ultimate example developing in the
late twelfth century. At the battle of
Hattin on 3-4 July 1187, the army Jerusalem fielded a large number of light
horsemen, called “Turcopoles.” John of
Ibelin tells us that the Franks could raise upwards of 5,000 of these mounted
sergeants. Used as light cavalry,
probably mounted archers, they typically found themselves in the role of
reconnaissance. Latin Turcopoles may
have come from the settled Frankish populations that had settled throughout the
countryside with their eastern Christian cousins. Their presence on the battles of the Middle East signals the
considerable adaptation of Frankish military methods, profiting from an
availability of light horses in the Near East.
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